세무조사를 받아 추징세액(법인세 추납액)을 납부한 기업의 경우 세무조사 수검연도 이후 당분간은 조사를 받지 않을 것을 예상하고 법인세 조사 직후에 조세회피 행위를 증가시킬 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 제도적 취약점을 사용한 경영자의 조세회피 행위의 증가는 국가의 재정건정성을 약화시키는 상당히 중요한 원인이 된다. 본 연구는 2005년부터 2015년까지 조사를 받은 후 법인세 추징세액(추납세액)이 발생하고 이 수치를 공시한 법인을 대상으로 세무조사 전후의 조세회피 수준의 변화에 대해 실증 분석하였다. 구체적으로 세무조사연도와 세무조사 전 1개 연도, 세무조사연도와 세무조사 후의 4개 연도의 세무조사와 적출세액을 독립변수로 하여 종속변수인 조세회피와 신고소득률 수준의 차이를 각각 분석하였다. 아울러 이러한 관계에 대해 이익조정 대용치인 재량적 발생액의 추가적인 설명력을 보이는지를 분석한다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 세무조사 전 1년보다 세무조사연도의 조세회피 수준이 감소(신고소득률은 증가)하는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 세무조사 수검연도(t)에 비해 세무조사 직후연도(t+1)에 조세회피 행위의 수준이 유의적으로 증가(신고소득률은 감소)하는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 세무조사 수검연도(t)에 비해 세무조사 2년 후(t+2)에 조세회피 행위의 수준이 유의적으로 증가(신고소득률은 감소)하는 것으로 나타났다. 넷째, 세무조사 수검연도(t)에 비해 세무조사 3년 후(t+3) 조세회피 수준이 증가(신고소득률은 감소)하는 것으로 나타났다. 요약하면, 세무조사 수검연도 이후 당분간은 법인세 조사를 받지 않을 것을 예상하고 조사 직후에 조세회피 행위를 확대시킬 수 있다. 세무조사 이후에 약 3년간은 조세회피를 지속적으로 유지하다가 세무조사 4년 후(t+4)에는 다음해 정기세무조사가 예정되는 직전년도임으로 조세회피를 하지 않는 것으로 판단된다.
In the case of a company that has undergone a tax audit and paid the additional tax, it is expected that it will not undergo a tax audit for some time after the tax audit examination year, and tax avoidance can be increased immediately after the audit. However, the increase in tax avoidance by companies using the loopholes of these systems is a major cause of deteriorating fiscal soundness. Therefore, this study empirically analyzed the change in the level of tax avoidance before and after the tax audit for corporations that disclosed the amount of additional tax collected as a result of a tax audit from 2005 to 2015. Specifically, the tax avoidance and reported income rates were analyzed for the tax audit year, the year before the tax audit, and the four years after the tax audit, respectively. In addition, it is analyzed whether the additional explanatory power of the discretionary accruals (PADJ), which is a proxy for earnings management, is shown for this relationship. In addition, this study used tax avoidance as three measures. The reported income rate was used as three measures. This study‘s analysis results are as follows. First, it was found that the level of tax avoidance in the tax audit year decreased compared to the year before the tax audit. In addition, it was found that the reported income rate in the tax audit year increased compared to the year before the tax audit. Second, it was found that the level of tax avoidance increased in the year immediately after the tax audit (t+1) compared to the tax audit year (t). In addition, the reported income rate decreased in the year immediately after the tax audit (t+1) compared to the tax audit year (t). Third, it was found that the level of tax avoidance increased two years after the tax audit (t+2) compared to the tax audit year (t). In addition, it was found that the reported income rate decreased two years after the tax audit (t+2) compared to the tax audit year (t). Fourth, it was found that the level of tax avoidance increased 3 years after the tax audit (t+3) compared to the tax audit year (t). In addition, it was found that the reported income rate decreased 3 years after the tax audit (t+3) compared to the tax audit year (t). In summary, it is expected that there will be no tax audit for the time being after the tax audit examination year, and tax avoidance can be increased immediately after the audit. The tax evasion is maintained for about 3 years after the tax audit, but after 4 years of the tax audit (t+4), it is judged that the tax evasion is not performed as it is the year just before the regular tax audit is scheduled for the following year. The limitations of this study are as follows. Currently, according to the disclosure regulations of Korean companies, the number of sample companies obligated to disclose additional tax (TIR) is very small, so the coefficient of multiple regression analysis using a sample of tax audit companies in this study may be biased in the estimation. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to re-verify at the time when Korea"s corporate disclosure regulations will be strengthened.