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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Anna Mun (Risk Communication Research Institute in Rainbow Communication & Consulting)
저널정보
한국언론학회 Asian Communication Research Asian Communication Research Vol.16 No.2
발행연도
2019.9
수록면
80 - 114 (35page)
DOI
10.20879/acr.2019.16.2.80

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This paper analyzes how market structure affects firms’ strategic choices in terms of the adoption of investor relations (IR). The effect of one firm’s IR activity may vary depending on the strategy choice of another firm in the market. In adopting game theory as a general tool to understand the strategic interaction among firms in this context, we utilize an economic model in which two competing firms are faced with the choice of whether or not to adopt IR. The game’s result shows that there are three possible scenarios depending on the cost implications of IR: (i) Status of Unadopted IR (UIR), (ii) Status of Monopolistic IR (MIR), and (iii) Status of Competitive IR (CIR). The findings reveal that in the case of MIR, firms are faced with a “game of chicken.” In this scenario, firms are incentivized to adopt an IR strategy prior to their counterpart’s adoption in order to take advantage of the effects of IR. In this case, these effects provide a greater reward to the firm which engages in monopolistic IR, a reward which otherwise disappears. In the CIR case, however, the adoption of IR is a dominant strategy for both firms, although their "payoffs" are less than is the case where neither firm adopts IR. This is a typical case of “the prisoners’ dilemma.” It clearly demonstrates why IR has been adopted by firms all over the world, regardless of whether or not its beneficial effects are outweighed by the costs involved. We also find that there exists a certain condition relative to costs in which IR activity, which would have been adopted in a monopolistic situation, is not adopted by either firm in the model in a duopolistic situation.

목차

Abstract
Introduction
Conceptual Framework
The Economic Model
Equilibrium Analysis
Concluding Remarks
References

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